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A B S T R A C T 
This article points out the benefits of employing a performance based analysis ap-
proach for ascertaining the likelihood that travelling fires in an office building could 
induce a localized failure that might trigger its collapse. The case study chosen is 
Building 7 of the World Trade Center complex. Based on the parametric study under-
taken, our findings were that the fire-protected steel floor beam, identified as the in-
itiator of the cascade of events that followed, could not have done so, virtually under 
any circumstance. 
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1. Introduction 
While the collapse of the WTC twin towers on 9/11 
received the lion’s share of publicity and, and rightly so, 
considering the thousands who lost their lives that day, 
the mystery of why the 47 storey steel framed building, 
WTC 7, that collapsed several hours later remains to this 
day a mystery in several respects. Indeed, the official Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) re-
port on that collapse was finally made public some seven 
years later in August 2008 (NIST, 2008a). Despite a cou-
ple of fuel tanks in the lower part of the building, the fires 
that precipitated collapse were claimed to have been 
caused by incendiary debris that catapulted from a 
plummeting WTC 1, severing columns and breaking win-
dows on the south face of #7 during its collapse. These 
flaming remnants then caused combustible materials 
within office areas to burn and spread from area to area, 
weakening structural members and causing thermal ex-
pansion of an identified floor beam claimed to have dis-
lodged the end of a particular girder resulting in “walk-
off” its column support. The analysis by NIST purport-
edly then caused a locally unsupported column to 
buckle, precipitating an array of failures that very 
quickly cascaded into storey-by-storey collapses leading 
to global collapse of the entire structure.  
Without laying blame on anyone, NIST attempted, 
through its strong working relationship with ASCE, to 
propose recommendations meant to ameliorate per-
ceived weaknesses in building codes to avoid such trag-
edies from happening in future, with particular attention 
on ways to protect occupants and to preserve a struc-
ture’s integrity when severe fires occur. This initiative 
resulted in NIST setting out 30 recommendations (NIST, 
2008b) that ranged from developing “consensus stand-
ards and code provisions” to “academic, professional 
short-courses, and web-based training programs”. 
Since the collapse of WTC 7 represents the first time 
in history that a steel-framed building of significance 
succumbed to fire loadings alone, it has given rise to 
much discussion among those in structural engineering 
and architecture. A software package known as Fire Dy-
namics Simulator (FDS) was developed by NIST to incor-
porate the vast array of information that is needed to de-
sign or make predictions about an existing structure’s 
safety when subjected to extreme fire loading events. 
However in either case, there are circumstances for 
which less sophistication is appropriate. A simplified 
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performance-based design (PBD) fire analysis, based on 
the laws of thermodynamics and structural engineering 
principles, able to include several parameters, and which 
examines specific details of a design may require such an 
approach, consistent with the time-temperature models 
such as described by Petterson et al. (1976). In our view, 
such an approach is appropriate with the initiation of the 
collapse of Building 7, to be examined in this paper. 
 
2. Basic Principles for Passive Resistance to Fire Loads 
For many decades, structural engineers relied solely 
upon fire resistance ratings to ascertain the passive pro-
tection needed for a steel frame structure, however, 
since 9/11, an alternative method known as Perfor-
mance-Based Design (PBD) has evolved, with the objec-
tive being to enhance our understanding of fire events in 
buildings and to employ methods, as needed, to provide 
protection. Frater and Kleinfeldt (2001) provide very 
useful introductory material in this regard. Other im-
portant papers appear in the Journal of Fire Sciences, of 
which the recent forum article by Quintiere and Williams 
(2014) suggests that the FDS method employed by NIST 
is “weak” in support of its rationale for the collapse. 
However, before launching into our own PBD analysis in 
connection with Building 7’s collapse, a few basic princi-
ples and assumptions are presented as follows. 
2.1. Heat energy release rate 
When combustible materials burn in air, the heat re-
lease rate generated, QC , is expended both as that which 
causes a change in temperature in the gases themselves, 
known as sensible heat, QS , and radiant heat, QR , which 
directly causes heating of the adjacent surfaces that are 
exposed. As such, the heat generated from a prescribed 
amount of combustible material is given by Gray and 
Muller (1974) as:   
𝑄𝐶 = 𝑄𝑆+𝑄𝑅 . (1) 
For typical office fires, QS , the sensible heat term, is 
mostly dissipated by hot exhaust combustion gases that 
involve three parameters, one of which is the chemical 
reaction gas mass combustion rate mG , a parameter 
which brings into play the conversion of a combustible 
material into a variety of gases released in the process. 
The equation that is applicable is given by;   
𝑄𝑆 = 𝑚𝐺𝑐𝑝∆𝑇 , (2) 
where, cp is the heat capacity of the combustion gases at 
constant pressure, and T is the increase in the temper-
ature of the combustion gases due to the fires from an 
initial temperature Ti to a higher temperature TG. 
The quantity mG may be derived from a consideration 
of the combustible material consumption rate, modified 
by the addition of oxygen. Such materials generally con-
sist of wood products or one form or other of plastic 
compounds. A common type of the latter may be repre-
sented by polystyrene, while the former is generally 
chemically equivalent to cellulose. In the case of polysty-
rene, its complete combustion in an oxygen environment 
is governed by the chemical formula;   
[𝐶8𝐻8]𝑛 + 10𝑛[𝑂2] = 8𝑛[𝐶𝑂2] + 4𝑛[𝐻2𝑂] , (3a) 
where n denotes the number of moles associated with 
each compound, while the reaction of burning cellulose 
is governed by  
[𝐶6𝐻10𝑂5]𝑛 + 6𝑛[𝑂2] = 6𝑛[𝐶𝑂2] + 5𝑛[𝐻2𝑂] . (3b) 
The combustion of 1 kg of polystyrene therefore re-
quires 3 kg of oxygen (Eq. (3a)), while that for 1 kg of 
cellulose necessitates 1.19 kg of O2 (Eq. (3b)). 
However, since we are dealing with combustion reac-
tions in air, each mole of O2 supplied to the fire is accom-
panied by 3.76 moles of N2, thus resulting in a reaction 
involving 5.1 kg of air per kg of the wood equivalent (cel-
lulose). Since each kilogram of fuel adds 1 kg of mass to 
the reaction products, we have a total of 6.1 kg of com-
bustion gases released per kg of cellulose burned. In the 
case of polystyrene, a similar mass balance computation 
will show that 14 kg of air is required for each kg of the 
plastic equivalent material resulting in 15 kg of combus-
tion gases produced. Of course, we do not know the pre-
cise composition of the combustible materials in typical 
office building fires. Taking an average between the two 
materials considered, we may assume that the combus-
tion of one kilogram of a wide variety of fuels is accompa-
nied by a total release of about 10 kg of “exhaust” gases 
consisting of a mixture of CO2, H2O and N2. It is reasonable 
to assume that for typical combustion gas mixtures, an 
average value for cp of 1.2 kJ/kg°C is appropriate since 
the heat capacity for the above-mentioned gases is close 
to 1 kJ/kg°C, while that of water vapor is much higher at 
about 1.9 kJ/kg°C. It is important to mention that incom-
plete combustion may involve other gases that could be 
classified as toxic such as carbon monoxide and would 
therefore dissipate more heat than that which we have 
described above. Our primary objective, of course, is to 
utilize an expression for QR that will allow computation 
of the temperature of the steel floor beam alleged to have 
triggered collapse as a function of fire duration. 
2.2. Radiant heat release rate 
As noted in Eq. (1), QR can be determined once QC and 
QS have been identified. However, each of QR and QS de-
pends on the temperature of the gases emanating from 
the flames within the prescribed compartments that are 
producing hot fires. Assuming that the combustibles are 
located below the partition height of typical cubicles, i.e. 
about ½ the floor-to-ceiling height, it is reasonable to 
conceive of the flames, on average reached that level, as 
noted in Fig. 1(a). Noted also, is a conceptual steel beam 
at the ceiling level above the work station. To determine 
the temperature at the flame tip interface, TG, it is con-
venient to employ the Stefan-Boltzmann equation (Gray 
and Muller, 2008) that expresses the radiant heat release 
rate, QR, due to burning materials in a compartment fire, 
noted as:  
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𝑄𝑅 = 𝜖𝐴𝜎𝑇𝐺
4
 , (4) 
where ϵ is the emissivity of the gas, A is the surface area 
of hot gas to air interface (assumed at the top of a parti-
tion wall), σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann constant and TG is 
the absolute temperature of the hot gases in degrees Kel-
vin. Since TG–Ti is also equal to ∆T in Eq. (2), it follows 
that TG can be computed if the other parameters in Eqs. 
(1) and (4) are specified. It will be assumed that Ti is 
room temperature of 20°C, i.e. 293 K, with other values 
being: σ = 5.67x10–8 W/m2K4, ϵ = 0.7 (Gray and Muller, 
1974) while A is expressed in m2.  
Substituting the above into Eq. (1) results in the fol-
lowing quartic algebraic equation   
𝜖𝐴𝜎𝑇𝐺
4 +𝑚𝐺𝑐𝑝𝑇𝐺 = 𝑄𝐶 +𝑚𝐺𝑐𝑝𝑇𝑖  . (5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Work area enclosure and surroundings (a) Con-
ceived fires and impacted local domain (b) Footprints of 
floor and heated ceiling areas. 
Once QC is selected, we can then solve for TG. In that 
regard, we need both an estimate of the heat capacity of 
the combustible materials in question, and an estimate 
of the mass consumption rate during typical office fires 
in order to compute TG. For the WTC fires, NIST esti-
mated a duration of 25 minutes as being a reasonable es-
timate for a burn rate period (NIST, 2008c). Fundamen-
tal to computing a maximum temperature for a particu-
lar structural member is an estimate of the fuel load that 
is either typical of office buildings, or which has been es-
tablished from earlier studies. Our focus is to employ the 
simple approach laid out through the set of equations 
quoted above to the floor beam that is claimed to have 
expanded sufficiently to cause column 79 at the 13th floor 
of WTC 7 to lose lateral support and hence trigger the 
collapse of the entire building. A sketch of the subject 
connection detail that is the focus of our case study is 
shown in Fig. 2 (Frankel Steel Limited, 1985a). 
 
Fig. 2. Plan view of member intersection at column 79 
(Data from Frankel Steel Limited, 1985b). 
If we adopt the NIST heat of combustion average 
value of 16 MJ/kg, a value that virtually coincides with 
that of Feasey and Buchanan (2002) and the 25 minute 
burn period noted above, 22.5 kg/m2 will generate a heat 
release rate, QC of 240 KW, the assumption being that the 
mass of combustible materials would diminish at a con-
stant rate of 0.015 kg/sec. This appears to be a reasona-
ble estimate, as the assumed amount of wood and plastic 
materials equivalent per m2 is often cited as 20 kg/m2 
(typical for office buildings). On the other hand, this esti-
mate, although reasonable for most office buildings, may 
not account for the unusual situation wherein excessively 
high fuel loading may result in some compartments ver-
sus that in others. Indeed, the NIST report indicates a load-
ing of 32 kg/m2 to be appropriate, a case to be examined, 
together with an even higher value of 45 kg/m2. This lat-
ter estimate is included to account for the case of travel-
ling fires, shown to augment the maximum temperature 
at a specific location by virtue of “far afield” fires 
(Jonsdottir et al., 2010). The heat release rates for these 
two fuel loadings are 341.3 and 480 KW respectively.  
For each fuel loading, we will undertake an array of 
analyses for a 16.2 m (53 foot) long W24x55 floor beam, 
an end shown in Fig. 2, is alleged to have triggered the 
cascade of failures and noted in Frankel Steel’s erection 
(a) 
(b) 
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drawing as K3004 (Frankel Steel Limited, 1985b). These 
will include unprotected steel cases, and three thick-
nesses of sprayed-on fire resisting material (SFRM), 13, 
20 and 40 mm, representing NIST’s estimate, an inter-
mediate value, and 2 hours of fire protection (Jonsdottir 
et al., 2010) respectively, when subjected to the standard 
fire curve. The aim of such protection is to limit the max-
imum steel temperature from exceeding the critical 
value of 620°C (893°Kelvin), deemed to weaken such a 
member to the point of failure (Jowsey and Scott, 2014). 
2.3. Combustion gas temperatures 
As noted earlier, the hot gas temperatures, generated 
at the interface of the zones above and below the cubicle 
partition level (Fig. 1(a)) can be determined by solving 
Eq. (5). The results obtained are as follows: 22.5 kg/m2 
gives TG = 1188°K; 32 kg/m2 gives TG = 1249°K, and 45 
kg/m2 results in a temperature of 1306°K, based on a 
constant heat release rate during a 25 minute period of 
combustion. 
 
3. Ceiling Room Temperatures 
The science of gas dynamics, fluid motion and heat 
transfer mechanisms indeed constitute a complex sub-
ject as they relate to burning fires in any environment. In 
the case of square-shaped cubicle-style compartments, 
we will assume that the heat generated from burning 
combustibles disperses outwards above such office en-
closures at 45 degrees as noted in Fig. 1, with the result 
that the heat affected ceiling zone, Ac is 3.5 times the 
floor area, Af, assumed to be square and of size H by H. 
This value is based on a ½ partition to ceiling height ra-
tio, with triangles connecting the off-set rectangles at the 
corners of a rectangular office layout as noted in the fig-
ure. We further assume that the heat generated at the 
flame interface, Af, is then uniformly spread out over that 
cubicle’s heat affected ceiling area, Ac. 
However, if several work stations are placed back-to-
back, the ceiling area footprint, Ac, is reduced relative to 
Af due to fanned overlapping of impacted ceiling areas. 
So, for example, an array of three aligned cubicles results 
in Ac/Af = 2.67, while for five, the value is 2.4. In the case 
of WTC 7, it seems reasonable to assume that material in 
3 work stations, aligned with the floor beam K3004 
might have been burning intensely simultaneously. If we 
assume, therefore, that the radiated heat, QR, is fully ab-
sorbed by the ceiling, its temperature, TC, based on Eq. 
(4) is then computed as TG/[4√(Ac/Af)] = TG/1.278. So, for 
the three fuel loadings noted above, the 22.5 kg/m2 case 
results in a ceiling temperature, TC, of 930°K, the 32 
kg/m2 case gives a value of 977°K, while 45 kg/m2 has a 
computed value of 1022°K. These computed tempera-
tures provide an estimate of the temperatures that the 
structural members would experience for fires generat-
ing a constant heat release rate over a period of 25 
minutes, after which burn out is presumed in a pre-
scribed location. The steps to follow are the computation 
of steel temperatures of K3004 over time, followed by a 
determination of that member’s elongation at the end of 
the burn period.  
4. Unprotected Steel 
In the case of heating of unprotected steel members, 
the following incremental equation is applicable 
(Jonsdottir et al., 2010):   
∆𝑇𝑆 =
𝐹
𝑉
∆𝑇
𝜌𝑆𝑐𝑆
{ℎ𝑐(𝑇𝐶 − 𝑇𝑆) + 𝜎𝜖(𝑇𝐶
4 − 𝑇𝑆
4} , (6) 
in which TS represents the steel’s temperature at time t 
due to a fire, the temperature of which at the level of the 
ceiling is TC, while the other quantities are defined as: 
F/V, the member’s section factor, computed for top 
flange embedment in floor slab concrete = 103 m-1 (W 
24x 55 floor beam) represents an average mid-depth of 
the member, while ρS is the density of steel (7820 
kg/m3), cS is its specific heat (460 J/kg K, where K being 
temperature in Kelvin), while hC is the convective heat 
transfer coefficient (7 W/m2 K (Oetelaar and Johnston, 
2012)). The factors σ and ϵ are the Stefan-Boltzmann and 
emissivity constants respectively, having values of 
5.67x10-8 W/m2 K4 and 0.7, noted earlier. In calculations 
to follow, hC(𝑇𝐶–𝑇𝑆) was much smaller than the σϵ (𝑇𝐶
4–
𝑇𝑆
4 ) term, but was included nonetheless for complete-
ness. 
4.1. Fuel loading = 22.5 kg/m2 
This is the fuel loading case which most closely ad-
heres to standards of combustible materials in office 
building compartments. Since the ceiling gas tempera-
ture was estimated to be 930°K, a time step of 1 minute 
(60 sec), following commencement of the fire, results in 
∆TS1 to compute as 58.2 degrees (K or C). The steel tem-
perature at the beginning of the next one minute step is 
therefore 351.2°K and results in ∆TS2 calculated to be 
56.9°K. Finally, at the end of the fire period, ∆TS25 com-
putes as 2.1°K, with the last time step of 60 sec. resulting 
in a final steel temperature of 925°K, or very near to the 
temperature of the ceiling gases. A plot of the steel tem-
perature-time curve is shown in Fig. 3, and represents 
the lowest one (22.5 kg/m2).  
4.2. Fuel loading = 32 kg/m2 
This is the case that NIST deemed to be the basis for 
their fire dynamics simulator (FDS) program. Since the 
burn time remains the same as in the previous case, i.e. 
25 minutes, a higher ceiling exposure temperature was 
expected, and computed to be 977°K. A similar pattern 
of temperature steps resulted from calculations, with TS 
computed to be 975.9°K. Its values are plotted in the fig-
ure as curve 32 kg/m2. 
4.3. Fuel loading = 45 kg/m2 
We recognize that there are unusual circumstances in 
which moveable materials may be temporarily stored in 
certain areas of a building during renovations, repairs or 
for operational reasons and hence we doubled 22.5 kg 
scenario’s value for such a possibility. In this case, TC = 
1022°K, with the maximum steel temperature reaching 
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1020°K. The uppermost curve in Fig. 3 shows a plot of 
this case. The final steel temperature for all three scenar-
ios, i.e. between 650 and 750°C, exceeds the critical tem-
perature of 620°C. As such, the computed carrying ca-
pacity of a given unprotected steel member would be 
exceeded and would likely cause a floor beam or girder 
to fail. A weakness in a connection detail, i.e. the way in 
which a member is joined to another, is oftentimes the 
reason for a localized failure and will be addressed sub-
sequently.
 
Fig. 3. Unprotected steel for a 25 minute fire.
5. Protected Steel 
To protect steel framed buildings and their occupants 
from the devastating effects of a major fire, the standard 
procedure for design is to provide fire proofing material 
in accordance with prescriptive code requirements. Such 
protection was apparently applied to all structural mem-
bers in WTC 7 and as such, the heating of the earlier iden-
tified floor beam is analyzed employing three thicknesses 
of SFRM (Sprayed-on Fire Resisting Material). For steel 
members that are provided with fire protection, the gov-
erning equation as noted by Jonsdottir et al. (2010) is:   
∆𝑇𝑠 =
𝐹
𝑉𝑑𝑖
∆𝑡𝑘𝑖(𝑇𝐶 − 𝑇𝑆)/{𝜌𝑆𝑐𝑆 + 𝑑𝑖𝜌𝑖𝑐𝑖𝐹/2𝑉} , (7) 
where ki is the thermal conductivity of the insulation, di 
its thickness, ρi the density, and ci its specific heat. Ap-
propriate values for low density spray type fire proofing 
as noted in the Steel Design Guide of AISC (Ruddy et al., 
2002), were adopted in our computations as, ki = 0.135 
W/(m°K), ρi = 293 kg/m3, and ci = 754 J/(kg°K), while 
thicknesses offering a reasonable range of estimates are 
noted as, di = 13, 20 and 40 mm, respectively. As noted 
for the unprotected steel cases, those scenarios pertain-
ing to protected steel assumed a constant high intensity 
25 minute burn period. Note that the same step-by-step 
procedure noted for the unprotected steel scenarios was 
utilized for the same fuel load cases noted in the previ-
ous section. Fig. 4 shows the plotted temperature-time 
results for the three fuel loading and three insulation 
thickness cases noted above while Table 1 summarizes 
the peak temperature values of the floor beam after a 25 
minute burn period.  
5.1. Fuel loading = 22.5 kg/m2, TC = 930°K 
In the case of the 13 mm SFRM scenario, it was found 
from Eq. (7) that the steel temperature, TS25 was 518°K 
after 25 minutes of a constant heat release rate from 
burning combustibles of 240 KW/m2. When 20 mm of 
SFRM is employed, the steel temperature TS25 is reduced 
to 447°K, while the 40 mm thickness case was only 
370°K. This latter circumstance appears to be consistent 
with the prescriptive standard for floor assemblies at the 
time that WTC 7 was constructed, i.e. at least a 2 hour fire 
rating (Jonsdottir et al., 2010). Clearly, such a tempera-
ture (97°C) would not pose a threat to a floor beam’s 
ability to carry design dead and live loadings. 
5.2. Fuel loading = 32 kg/m2, TC = 977°K 
These cases appear to correspond to the fuel loading 
and burn time duration assumptions made in the NIST 
report (NIST, 2012). When 13 mm of SFRM is employed, 
the floor beam’s average temperature gradually rises as 
shown in Fig. 4(b), reaching a maximum value of 535°K 
at the end of the 25 minute period. Increasing the pro-
tection to a thickness of 20 mm reduced the maximum 
temperature to 458°K while a value di = 40 mm lowered 
TS25 even further, i.e. down to 376°K. As noted, this case, 
and the other two noted in the sub-title are associated 
with a ceiling gas temperature of 977°K. The lowermost 
curve represents a most likely scenario, based on NIST 
information, assuming, of course, that the contractors 
and inspectors fulfilled their respective obligations dur-
ing construction of the building.  
5.3. Fuel loading = 45 kg/m2, TC = 1022°K 
As noted earlier, the cases that follow under this head-
ing are very extreme in the nature of combustible load-
ings, and would only be plausible in the most extraordi-
nary circumstances. For the case of 13 mm SFRM, it turns 
out that the steel floor beam would have experienced a 
maximum temperature of 551°K.  
By increasing the thickness of SFRM to 20 and 40 mm 
respectively, the time-temperature calculations indicate 
maximum values of TS = TS25 = 469 and 381°K respec-
tively. 
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Fig. 4. SFRM protected steel (25 minute fire) - Results corresponding to TC = 977°K.
Table 1. 25 minute burn period (protected steel). 
Fuel Load 22.5 kg/m2 32 kg/m2 45 kg/m2 
TG  °K 1188 1249 1306 
TC °K 930 977 1022 
di (mm) 13 20 40 13 20 40 13 20 40 
TS25 °K 518 447 370 535 458 376 551 469 381 
A summary of the key information associated with the 
above analyses is presented in Table 1. Note an interest-
ing observation with respect to the degree of insensitiv-
ity existing among all cases having a prescribed thick-
ness of protection to the fuel loading parameter. For ex-
ample, doubling the fuel load from 22.5 to 45 kg/m2 for 
the 13 mm case, increases the temperature of the floor 
beam by only 33°K, with an even more modest difference 
of 11°K obtained for 40 mm of insulation. If we make a 
supposition that NIST’s estimate of the fire duration of 
25 minutes might actually have been on the low side, 
what increase or decrease would be expected in steel 
temperatures for the previous cases described above for 
the same fuel loadings? After all, the duration time was 
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based on outside- the- building viewing, and hence it’s of 
interest to postulate the possibility that travelling fires 
may have resided in one area for 30 minutes rather than 
25. Doing such an analysis is very simple if one employs 
a PBD analysis approach, rather than NIST’s FDS method 
which is costly and time-consuming. 
 
6. Sensitivity of Steel Temperatures to Fire 
Duration Time 
For a given amount of combustible materials, there is 
a fixed amount of heat energy available for release to the 
environment. Since the heat release rate of combustible 
materials is dependent on several factors, such as, the 
ventilation factor, material composition, moisture con-
tent, and the average heat of combustion etc., it’s of in-
terest to investigate the effect of increasing the burn 
time while maintaining the fuel combustion capacity at 
16 MJ/kg. Indeed, NIST was uncertain about the time of 
intense burning and mentions in their report (NIST, 
2008a) an estimated burn period of 20 to 30 minutes. An 
increase from 25 to 30 minutes will therefore result in a 
reduced heat release rate which is proportional to the 
burn time period.  
Repeating the calculations, then, for a 30 minute pe-
riod results in somewhat lower values of interface of 
flame-to-air layer temperatures, TG, and hence corre-
spondingly reduced values of ceiling gas temperatures, 
TC. For example, QC reduces from 240 KJ/sec to 200 
KJ/sec, with the consequence that TG in Eq. (5) reduces 
from 1188°K to 1155°K for the 22.5 kg/m2 cases. Similar 
reductions occur for the 32 and 45 kg/m2 scenarios. Sub-
sequent TC  values have proportional reductions since 
the ceiling to floor area factor (8/3)0.25 is the same for all 
cases.  
Fig. 5 presents plots of time-steel temperature curves 
for identical cases utilized in Fig. 4. As such, the curves 
look very similar with final temperatures being at the 
maximum values at the end of the burn period, in this 
case, 30 minutes. A summary of the same data shown in 
Table 1 is given in Table 2 for the 30 minute scenarios. 
Note that all final temperatures are slightly higher than 
their counterparts in Table 1, indicating that duration 
time weighs more heavily than does gas temperature. 
We do not claim that this trend would extend out to an 
infinite burn time, of course, since such a scenario would 
result in gas temperatures that would hardly exceed the 
ambient air temperature Ti. 
 
7. Consequences of Steel Floor Beam Heating 
Any of the scenarios above would have been theoret-
ically possible, but many are highly unlikely. Those cases 
in which the steel is totally unprotected are meant to 
highlight the benefits achieved in providing insulating 
material that meets fire rating requirements. Since ten-
ants in office buildings are generally free to utilize space 
in an unrestricted manner, it seems prudent to over-es-
timate, rather than to under-estimate fuel loads in fire 
engineering design. The 22.5 kg/m2 fuel load is close to 
the norm in office buildings, the 32 value was judged by 
NIST to be more appropriate, and the 45 kg/m2 value is 
clearly on the high side of what one would expect from 
the type of business and confidentiality attributes that 
are pertinent to tenancies involving finance and business, 
in general. In the case described, it is the 12th storey of 
WTC 7, i.e. beam K3004 on the 13th floor that was at issue. 
It is well known that temperatures of structural steel 
in excess of about 893°K (620°C) will reduce member 
strength to a level below that which will support in-ser-
vice loads. Hence, for the unprotected steel scenarios, 
Fig. 3 provides us with some insight into the times at 
which a hot fire consuming combustible materials would 
potentially result in failures. We noted earlier that such 
rates varied from a minimum of 0.015 kg/sec (22.5 
kg/m2), to the maximum value of 0.03 kg/sec (45 kg/m2). 
As observed from the figure, a potential failure state 
could be predicted after 18 minutes for the least amount 
of combustibles considered, 13 minutes for the middle 
case (32 kg/m2), and 10 minutes for the 45 kg/m2 case 
(uppermost curve). Since the fires were presumed to last 
for 25 minutes, we may conclude that floor beam K3004 
would have failed. However, we have confidence that 
SFRM was applied properly, with adequate thicknesses, 
either for a 2 hour fire rating, or at least a one hour. The 
question therefore is the extent to which elongation of 
the noted floor beam occurred, and thence whether such 
expansion could have triggered a cascading sequence of 
failures that resulted in the entire building’s demise. This 
matter is explored in the next section.
Table 2. 30 minute burn period (protected steel). 
Fuel Load 22.5 kg/m2 32 kg/m2 45 kg/m2 
TG  °K 1155 1217 1275 
TC °K 904 952 998 
di (mm) 13 20 40 13 20 40 13 20 40 
TS25 °K 542 465 381 561 479 388 580 492 394 
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Fig. 5. SFRM protected steel (30 minute fire) - Results corresponding to TC = 952°K.
8. Protected Steel Floor Beam Elongation 
Fig. 4 shows plots of computed steel temperature 
curves for fire exposure times ranging over the full 25 
minute period. As expected, the steel temperature is 
highest when the fuel load is at 45 kg/m2, and the SFRM 
is 13 mm in thickness. However, at 25 minutes, we only 
obtain a temperature of 551°K (278°C) for this case, 
which is well below the critical strength value. When we 
examine the results for a 30 minute fire, the maximum 
temperature is 580°K for 13 mm of SFRM. Again, the is-
sue of strength is not in question, but it does raise the 
issue of what thermal elongation would one obtain is 
such a scenario?  
If a structural member is free to elongate as a conse-
quence of a temperature increase, its elongation is simply 
the product of αT, the coefficient of linear expansion with 
the associated length and change in temperature. In the 
case of the floor beam designated as K3004 in Frankel 
Steel’s set of drawings, it was connected to girder A2001 
(Fig. 2) that is alleged to have fallen off its shelf bearing 
plate support on column 79. The length of the floor beam 
was noted as being 53 feet (16.2 m). Roaming fires are 
unlikely to have the same intensity of temperature over 
that full length, but perhaps a half-length of 8.1 m would 
be a reasonable estimate. Assuming that displacement 
was essentially prevented at the perimeter column end 
yet unrestrained to move longitudinally at the girder 
end, the displacement would be 13.0 x 10-6 x 8.1 x ∆T °C 
(expressed in meters). For the case noted here for the 30 
minute fire, and a 45 kg/m2 fuel load  ∆T = (580 – 293) °C 
= 287°C, and so the floor beam elongation computes as 
30.2 mm (1.19 in). By taking the unrealistic circum-
stance that the fire caused the entire length of the beam 
to reach 580°K (307°C) results in the elongation being 
60.4 mm (2.38”), a displacement << 152.4 mm (6”), i.e. 
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the half width of the bearing plate shelf angle support. 
Clearly, the lateral displacement of girder A2001 then 
would not have been in jeopardy since walk-off would 
require the web of the girder reaching beyond the bear-
ing plate’s edge (Fig. 2). Indeed, if one computes the elon-
gation value of the one end free (col.79) and the other 
fully restrained, and employs the temperature increase 
suggested by NIST of 400°C over the full length, an unre-
strained elongation of 84 mm (3.3 in) results, which is 
again much less that the walk-off lateral displacement of 
the girder. 
 
9. Discussion 
The assumptions noted above, pertaining to the walk-
off displacement of girder A2001, presupposed that it 
was free to displace laterally on its bearing seat support.  
In fact, displacements noted above, would have been fur-
ther reduced by virtue of the composite action of the 
girder with the floor slab that involved ¾” shear studs, 
spaced 18” along its length, as noted by Salvarinas 
(1986).  It is well known by professional engineers who 
are involved in composite construction that shear studs 
rarely “shear off” when horizontal shear forces are acti-
vated by external loadings.  They resist such forces by 
bending during conditions in which relative differences 
in horizontal displacements between a steel member 
and a concrete slab takes place, and as such are able to 
utilize their axial ultimate resistances. A similar situation 
exists for the floor beams.  If a floor system employs com-
posite construction, all major structural members in 
contact with a given floor slab will be connected with 
shear studs.  If, as NIST indicated, such connectors were 
missing in girder A2001, such an omission might have 
been construed as a serious flaw in inspection. On the 
other hand, our calculations suggest that it matters not 
whether shear studs were or were not present – there 
would not have been walk-off in either instance.  
For the girder A2001 to column 79 connection to even 
be a point of issue with respect to triggering collapse of 
WTC 7, it raises the question of whether such a detail is 
desirable or not.  Fastening the girder by two bolts on its 
bottom flange to a welded seat support, seems to be in-
appropriate when large differential displacements are 
possible.  It would appear to be more prudent to use a 
bearing seat support for erection purposes only, and em-
ploy double girder web angles, or equivalent, to secure 
that member to the column.  Perhaps NIST might wish to 
recommend to steel structural code committees that for 
unusual forms of member layouts for floors (as was the 
case with WTC 7) a more robust form of connecting steel 
members to one another may be justified.  
 
10. Conclusions 
By applying the principles inherent in performance-
based design to a localized area of a structure deemed to 
have been the trigger that resulted in cascading failures 
and thence collapse of a building (WTC 7), our investiga-
tion was meant to confirm or deny such a conclusion 
reached by NIST based on their costly and time-consum-
ing Fire Dynamics Simulator software package.  By em-
ploying basic thermodynamic principles, equations ap-
propriate to heat flow, together with the combustion 
properties of materials of wood and plastic-based fuel 
sources, and normal structural and fire resisting mate-
rial properties, we came to the opposite conclusion to 
that of NIST, namely that, regardless of fuel loading cho-
sen, or which of three thicknesses of SFRM selected, fires 
alone could not have caused the commencement of the 
collapse of Building 7 at the location cited. 
To arrive at such a conclusion, we made the key as-
sumption, not challenged by NIST, that SFRM was em-
ployed and was intact during the fire event on 9/11. We 
also made the assumption that the heat release rates of 
fires were intense and constant for duration times of 25 
or 30 minutes and impinged structural surfaces in the 
form of radiation and circulating hot gases with a con-
stant temperature determined by the fuel load assumed 
and the distance of the ceiling above any given cubicle’s 
partition height.  At the end of the burn period, we con-
cluded that floor beam K3004, located on the 13th floor, 
and which was exposed to hot flames in the 12 storey, 
either over its half length or even its full length, could not 
have elongated enough to cause a crucial walk-off of its 
adjoining girder.  This conclusion is valid, whether or not 
shear connectors were present or not.  
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